Examines how the US, the Soviet Union and various European powers have developed their grand Strategies - how they have integrated their political, economic and military goals in order to preserve their long-term interests in times of war and peace.
History by Williamson Murray,Richard Hart Sinnreich
In diesem Buch spannt Robert Greene einen weiten Bogen und stellt uns die Großmeister der Strategie vor, von Sunzi bis Churchill, von Hannibal über Friedrich den Großen bis Napoleon. Von ihren großen Erfolgen, aber auch von ihren Fehlern kann jeder lernen, denn strategisches Denken braucht man überall: in Wirtschaft und Politik, im Beruf wie im Privatleben. Die "33 Gesetze der Strategie" des Bestsellerautors Robert Greene erstmals auf Deutsch: knapp, prägnant, unterhaltsam.
This book explores fundamental questions about grand strategy, as it has evolved across generations and countries. It provides an overview of the ancient era of grand strategy and a detailed discussion of its philosophical, military, and economic foundations in the modern era. The author investigates these aspects through the lenses of four approaches - those of historians, social scientists, practitioners, and military strategists. The main goal is to provide contemporary policy makers and scholars with a historic and analytic framework in which to evaluate and conduct grand strategy. By providing greater analytical clarity about grand strategy and describing its nature and its utility for the state, this book presents a comprehensive theory on the practice of grand strategy in order to articulate the United States' past, present, and future purpose and position on the world stage.
Some sixty years after the Far Eastern War ended, this innovative new collection brings together five distinguished UK-based scholars and five from Japan to reappraise their respective country's leadership in the Malaya and Burma campaigns. This leadership is analyzed on various levels, ranging from the grand strategic to operational. The Japanese contributors examine the reasons for their forces, brilliant advances in 1941-42, whereas the British writers have to account for the disastrous defeat, characterized by the poor leadership of senior commanders such as Bennett and Percival. Between 1943 and 1945, the tables were turned dramatically, so the failure of Japanese command decisions then comes under critical scrutiny and the British have to explain how defeat was transformed into victory. Above all, this volume should stimulate interest in different methods and styles of military leadership in view of the contrasting approaches of the British and Japanese in the Second World War.
Entscheidungen, die Geschichte machten Der Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs stellte die Regierungschefs der Welt vor lebenswichtige Entscheidungen. In London, Berlin, Washington, Rom, Moskau und Tokio mussten Politiker und Generäle weitreichende Beschlüsse fassen. Ian Kershaw nimmt zehn Entscheidungen, die für den Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkriegs von zentraler Bedeutung waren, in den Blick und macht deutlich, dass in diesem Kampf nichts vorherbestimmt war. Die Ereignisse, die den Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs markierten, versetzten weite Teile der Welt in eine Art Schockzustand. Plötzlich schien es keine Regeln mehr zu geben. Die Aggressoren kannten für ihr Tun keine Grenzen, für ihre Opfer aber zogen dunkle Zeiten herauf. Im Strudel dieser Ereignisse sah sich eine kleine Gruppe von Politikern mit zentralen Entscheidungen konfrontiert, die in dieser Auseinandersetzung Triumph oder Untergang bedeuten konnten. In seinem glänzend geschriebenen Buch »Wendepunkte« vermittelt der Historiker Ian Kershaw dem Leser einen einzigartigen Eindruck davon, wie groß der Entscheidungsspielraum der einzelnen Politiker tatsächlich war und welche Rolle ihre ganz individuelle Persönlichkeit spielte: Warum entschloss sich Churchill, nach der französischen Kapitulation weiterzukämpfen? Warum vertraute Stalin darauf, dass Hitler die UdSSR nicht überfallen würde? Und warum griffen die Japaner Pearl Harbor an? Diese und weitere Entscheidungen veränderten den Lauf der Welt. Die zehn wichtigsten Entscheidungen des Zweiten Weltkriegs und die Männer, die sie trafen.
The United States today is the most powerful nation in the world, perhaps even stronger than Rome was during its heyday. It is likely to remain the world's preeminent power for at least several decades to come. What behavior is appropriate for such a powerful state? To answer this question, Robert J. Art concentrates on "grand strategy"-the deployment of military power in both peace and war to support foreign policy goals. He first defines America's contemporary national interests and the specific threats they face, then identifies seven grand strategies that the United States might contemplate, examining each in relation to America's interests. The seven are: •dominion-forcibly trying to remake the world in America's own image; • global collective security-attempting to keep the peace everywhere; •regional collective security-confining peacekeeping efforts to Europe; • cooperative security-seeking to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting other states' offensive capabilities; • isolationism-withdrawing from all military involvement beyond U.S. borders; •containment-holding the line against aggressor states; and •selective engagement-choosing to prevent or to become involved only in those conflicts that pose a threat to the country's long-term interests. Art makes a strong case for selective engagement as the most desirable strategy for contemporary America. It is the one that seeks to forestall dangers, not simply react to them; that is politically viable, at home and abroad; and that protects all U.S. interests, both essential and desirable. Art concludes that "selective engagement is not a strategy for all times, but it is the best grand strategy for these times."
Vietnam's Transition from Cold War to Globalization
Author: David W.P. Elliott
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Category: Political Science
Throughout the entire Cold War era, Vietnam served as a grim symbol of the ideological polarity that permeated international politics. But when the Cold War ended in 1989, Vietnam faced the difficult task of adjusting to a new world without the benefactors it had come to rely on. In Changing Worlds, David W. P. Elliott, who has spent the past half century studying modern Vietnam, chronicles the evolution of the Vietnamese state from the end of the Cold War to the present. When the communist regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed, so did Vietnam's model for analyzing and engaging with the outside world. Fearing that committing fully to globalization would lead to the collapse of its own system, the Vietnamese political elite at first resisted extensive engagement with the larger international community. Over the next decade, though, China's rapid economic growth and the success of the Asian "tiger economies," along with a complex realignment of regional and global international relations reshaped Vietnamese leaders' views. In 1995 Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its former adversary, and completed the normalization of relations with the United States. By 2000, Vietnam had "taken the plunge" and opted for greater participation in the global economic system. Vietnam finally joined the World Trade Organization in 2006. Elliott contends that Vietnam's political elite ultimately concluded that if the conservatives who opposed opening up to the outside world had triumphed, Vietnam would have been condemned to a permanent state of underdevelopment. Partial reform starting in the mid-1980s produced some success, but eventually the reformers' argument that Vietnam's economic potential could not be fully exploited in a highly competitive world unless it opted for deep integration into the rapidly globalizing world economy prevailed. Remarkably, deep integration occurred without Vietnam losing its unique political identity. It remains an authoritarian state, but offers far more breathing space to its citizens than in the pre-reform era. Far from being absorbed into a Western-inspired development model, globalization has reinforced Vietnam's distinctive identity rather than eradicating it. The market economy led to a revival of localism and familism which has challenged the capacity of the state to impose its preferences and maintain the wartime narrative of monolithic unity. Although it would be premature to talk of a genuine civil society, today's Vietnam is an increasingly pluralistic community. Drawing from a vast body of Vietnamese language sources, Changing Worlds is the definitive account of how this highly vulnerable Communist state remade itself amidst the challenges of the post-Cold War era.
Some of the nation's most respected scholars of international affairs examine the debates over U.S. grand strategy in light of U.S. security policies and interests in tactical regions around the world. The contributors begin by describing the four grand strategies currently competing for dominance of U.S. foreign policy: neo-isolationism argues that the United States should not become involved in conflicts outside specifically defined national interests selective engagement proposes that the United States, despite its position as the world's only remaining superpower, should limit its involvement in foreign affairs cooperative security advocates that the United States is not and should not act as an imperial country primacy asserts that the United States is an empire and therefore it should conduct an expansive foreign policy. Focusing on regions that present new challenges to U.S. grand strategy, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, the contributors offer the most current examinations of U.S. policies and assess the effectiveness of competing strategies in each region. The Obligation of Empire offers an innovative set of foreign policy initiatives that explore the tensions between global agendas and regionalist approaches. Contributors: Andrew J. Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Dale Davis, Thomas Donnelly, James J. Hentz, Clifford Kiracofe, Charles Kupchan, Jeffrey Stark, S. Frederick Starr, and Brantley Womack. James J. Hentz, associate professor of international studies at the Virginia Military Institute, is the coeditor of New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State.
Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security
Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Category: Political Science
While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country's military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful. Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.
„Wer glaubt, Machiavelli sage, Politik könne man nur mit Gift und Dolch, Lüge und Verbrechen machen, hat ihn gründlich missverstanden. Wo es ohne diese Dinge geht, darf man diese Mittel gar nicht anwenden, nicht aus moralischen Gründen, sondern weil es unpolitisch wäre, es zu tun. Wo aber, gewissermaßen von der Technik des Machtkampfes her, in einer bestimmten Lage Gift und Dolch, Lüge und Verbrechen nicht entbehrt werden können, um den Gegner zu überwinden, wenn es wirklich um Sein oder Nichtsein geht, dann ist einer als Staatsmann nur dann richtig am Platze, wenn er es über sich bringt, sich dieser Mittel zu bedienen, sei es als nihilistischer Zyniker, sei es als einer, der dem Staat „das Königsopfer seiner Seele“ bringt. Das ist der Sinn des Wortes von Machiavelli, dass ein Staatsmann auch böse handeln können müsse.“ – Carlo Schmid.
A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century
Author: Gary Hart
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Category: Political Science
Today, even as America asserts itself globally, it lacks a grand strategy to replace "containment of communism." In this short, sharp book, Gary Hart outlines a new grand strategy, one directing America's powers to the achievement of its large purposes. Central to this strategy is the power of American ideals, what Hart calls "the fourth power." Constitutional liberties, representative government, press freedom--these and other democratic principles, attractive to peoples worldwide, constitute a resource that may prove as important to national security and the national interest in this dangerous new century as traditional military, economic and political might. A bracing vision of an America responsive to a full spectrum of global challenges, The Fourth Power calls for a deeper understanding both of the threats we face and the profound strengths at our disposal to fight them.