Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate aswell as business school students. This text is the first to provideboth a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety ofreal-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business,political science, and the law. Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.
Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling taught a course in game theory and rational choice to advanced students and government officials for 45 years. In this book, Robert Dodge provides in language for a broad audience the concepts that Schelling taught. Armed with Schelling's understanding of game theory methods and his approaches to problems, the general reader can improve daily decision making.
Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games (D.C. Heath, 1991), carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to match how game theory courses are actually taught, making Playing for Real a more versatile text that almost all possible course designs will find easier to use, with less jumping about than before. In addition, the problem sections, already used as a reference by many teachers, have become even more clever and varied, without becoming too technical. Playing for Real will sell into advanced undergraduate courses in game theory, primarily those in economics, but also courses in the social sciences, and serve as a reference for economists.
Covering all the essential topics for undergraduate courses, this is the ideal student introduction to game theory. The book sets out the basics of the subject in a non-technical way. All discussion and explanation is clear, well structured, and entirely accessible to students of both economics and business. In addition to describing and explaining the basic theory, Game Theory uses illustrations and examples to show its application to realistic, topical, and interesting problems-ranging from strategic decision-making within companies to international environmental policy-making. The book also features exercises with accompanying solutions to allow the student to check progress throughout the course, and a guide to further reading at the end of each chapter.
Game theory provides a mathematical setting for analyzing competition and cooperation in interactive situations. The theory has been famously applied in economics, but is relevant in many other sciences, such as political science, biology, and, more recently, computer science. This book presents an introductory and up-to-date course on game theory addressed to mathematicians and economists, and to other scientists having a basic mathematical background. The book is self-contained, providing a formal description of the classic game-theoretic concepts together with rigorous proofs of the main results in the field. The theory is illustrated through abundant examples, applications, and exercises. The style is distinctively concise, while offering motivations and interpretations of the theory to make the book accessible to a wide readership. The basic concepts and results of game theory are given a formal treatment, and the mathematical tools necessary to develop them are carefully presented. Cooperative games are explained in detail, with bargaining and TU-games being treated as part of a general framework. The authors stress the relation between game theory and operations research. The book is suitable for a graduate or an advanced undergraduate course on game theory.
A graduate-level, mathematically rigorous introduction to strategic behavior in a networked world. This introductory graduate-level text uses tools from game theory and graph theory to examine the role of network structures and network effects in economic and information markets. The goal is for students to develop an intuitive and mathematically rigorous understanding of how strategic agents interact in a connected world. The text synthesizes some of the central results in the field while also simplifying their treatment to make them more accessible to nonexperts. Thus, students at the introductory level will gain an understanding of key ideas in the field that are usually only taught at the advanced graduate level. The book introduces basic concepts from game theory and graph theory as well as some fundamental algorithms for exploring graphs. These tools are then applied to analyze strategic interactions over social networks, to explore different types of markets and mechanisms for networks, and to study the role of beliefs and higher-level beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). Specific topics discussed include coordination and contagion on social networks, traffic networks, matchings and matching markets, exchange networks, auctions, voting, web search, models of belief and knowledge, and how beliefs affect auctions and markets. An appendix offers a “Primer on Probability.” Mathematically rigorous, the text assumes a level of mathematical maturity (comfort with definitions and proofs) in the reader.
Random SALOHA and CSMA protocols that are used to access MAC in ad hoc networks are very small compared to the multiple and spontaneous use of the transmission channel. So they have low immunity to the problems of packet collisions. Indeed, the transmission time is the critical factor in the operation of such networks. The simulations demonstrate the positive impact of erasure codes on the throughput of the transmission in ad hoc networks. However, the network still suffers from the intermittency and volatility of its efficiency throughout its operation, and it switches quickly to the saturation zone. In this context, game theory has demonstrated his ability to lead the network to a more efficient equilibrium. This, we were led to propose our model code set that formalizes the behavior of nodes during transmission within SALOHA networks and CSMA respectively.