Nicholas Eftimiades examines the infiltration of Chinese espionage agents into foreign governments and private businesses. He specifically addresses the human source in intelligence operations, and how these tactics fit into the conduct of internal and foreigh affairs in China.
As China engages ever more broadly and intensively in international affairs, the most understudied element of China's rise is how Beijing learns about the world. The intelligence services of the People's Republic of China (PRC) remain hidden under a shroud of secrecy and censorship. Their operations are similarly opaque. Conventional wisdom has failed to explain the growing number of espionage cases linked to Beijing. Without clear justification, observers seem to treat every major case from Larry Wu-Tai Chin to Lo Hsien-che as exceptions to how PRC intelligence services conduct operations. The time has come to revisit the foundations for analyzing why and how the PRC collects intelligence. This study examines the conceptual, historical, and institutional roots of modern Chinese intelligence as well as the case record. These findings are tested against three competing concepts for how the PRC intelligence services collect foreign intelligence: the conventional wisdom ("mosaic" or "grains of sand"), the Western/Russian model, and the "adapted internal security" concept. Based on this research, the PRC intelligence services most likely operate as internal security services, adapting to meet the leadership`s growing need for foreign intelligence. The PRC services normally exploit opportunities for foreign intelligence collection identified through routine internal security operations rather than targeting operations to meet leadership demands for foreign information. This finding suggests Beijing probably is better informed on foreign issues directly related to China, when the intelligence services can exploit people who have spent time in the PRC.
The Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence covers the history of Chinese Intelligence from 400 B.C. to modern times. This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, an extensive bibliography, and an index. The dictionary section has over 400 cross-referenced entries on the agencies and agents, the operations and equipment, the tradecraft and jargon, and many of the countries involved. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Chinese Intelligence.
A critical analysis of China's intelligence activities to include espionage, economic espionage, covert action, and export violations. This work is the most detailed work ever published in the unclassified world on China's intelligence tradecraft. It includes analysis of 595 cases of espionage, economic espionage, covert action, theft of technology and trade secrets. The study identifies and analyzes the specific espionage tradecraft used by China's intelligence services, State Owned Enterprises, private companies, and individuals. This is the first in a series of monographs on 'Chinese Intelligence Operations'. Each (5k - 10k) will focus on a specific aspects of China's espionage.
This is the first book of its kind to employ hundreds of Chinese sources to explain the history and current state of Chinese Communist intelligence operations. It profiles the leaders, top spies, and important operations in the history of China's espionage organs, and links to an extensive online glossary of Chinese language intelligence and security terms. Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil present an unprecedented look into the murky world of Chinese espionage both past and present, enabling a better understanding of how pervasive and important its influence is, both in China and abroad.
China's covert intelligence capability seems vast mainly because of the country's huge population and the historic Chinese diaspora that has spread worldwide. Traditionally focused inward, China as an emerging power is determined to compete with more established powers by aiming its intelligence operations at a more global audience. China is driven most of all by the fact that it has abundant resources and a lot of catching up to do. China's intelligence services may not be as famous as the CIA or the KGB, but their operations are widespread and well known to counterintelligence agencies throughout the world. Although China follows a different intelligence paradigm that has often shown its rough edges, it is refining its technique. It is training a professional class of intelligence officers beginning even before the candidates enter the university, and it is involving its military, particularly its naval forces, in peacekeeping, foreign-aid and anti-piracy operations worldwide. This is doing much to improve China's international image at a time when the Western world may view China as a threatening emerging power. Meanwhile, China will continue to pursue a long-term intelligence strategy that the West may not consider very advanced, but STRATFOR believes it would be a mistake to underestimate this patient and persistent process. The Chinese may not be that keen on the dead-drops, surveillance and dramatic covert operations that permeate spy novels, but their effectiveness may be better than we know. Larry Chin achieved world-class status as a practitioner of operational security without following Western methods, and there may be plenty of others like him.
Chinese espionage against the United States is not just a recent phenomenon. Chinese intelligence actors have infiltrated U.S. national security entities since the earliest days of the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, reports of Chinese espionage against the United States have risen significantly over the past 15 years. At the same time, the national security concerns and implications of these breaches have grown and made U.S.-China security tensions, Beijing's expanding military might, and questions about the PRC's strategic intentions. In addition to the many cases of Chinese espionage conducted in the United States, the threat from Chinese intelligence collection also extends outside of the United States. The United States shares military equipment and national security secrets with many countries that China has targeted with espionage operations. China's infiltration of defense entities in these countries could allow China to extract sensitive U.S. national defense information. China has also invested significant resources in building up its capabilities to collect military technical intelligence. These capabilities would strengthen China's hand in a military confrontation with the United States, its allies, or partners.
Provides an unclassified reference handbook which explains the categories of intelligence threat, provides an overview of worldwide threats in each category, and identifies available resources for obtaining threat information. Contents: intelligence collection activities and disciplines (computer intrusion, etc.); adversary foreign intelligence operations (Russian, Chinese, Cuban, North Korean and Romanian); terrorist intelligence operations; economic collections directed against the U.S. (industrial espionage); open source collection; the changing threat and OPSEC programs.